What have we learned from Chilcot about these two issues? On intelligence and WMD, the report has concluded, quite clearly, that fault lies with the intelligence services for allowing an exaggerated and misleading impression of the threat posed by Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction to be communicated to the public. The report states: ‘Intelligence and assessments made by the JIC about Iraq’s capabilities and intent continued to be used to prepare briefing material to support Government statements in a way which conveyed certainty without acknowledging the limitations of the intelligence (Section 4.3, p. 290). It also states that the ‘the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) had a responsibility to ensure that key recipients of its reporting were informed in a timely way when doubts arose about key sources and when, subsequently, intelligence was withdrawn.’ (Section 4.3, p. 290). 

Ultimately, responsibility for these failings lie with Sir John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), who oversaw the translation of intelligence assessments into public documents, and Sir Richard Dearlove, Head of MI6, who was responsible for feeding the human intelligence reports into both JIC assessments and directly to Blair. Scarlett allowed nuanced intelligence assessments to be massaged into presenting greater certainty than was warranted. For Dearlove the most embarrassing new information relates to the notorious Report X which was used to underpin the claim that there was current and active production of chemical and biological weapons material. The source for this intelligence triggered questions almost immediately because some of his claims, regarding glass containers for chemical/biological weapons, seemed to have been inspired by a Hollywood movie ‘The Rock’, starring Sean Connery and Nicholas Cage. Despite the fact that information from this source underpinned the most important dossier judgement (that Iraq was actively producing WMD), apparently Dearlove never saw fit to warn Blair or other officials of these emerging doubts.

At the same time, Chilcot also places blame on Blair himself for over-interpreting the intelligence in his public announcements. The report states: 

The statement that Mr Blair believed Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction was 'a current and serious threat to the UK national interest' reflected his view. But it did not reflect the view of the JIC, which had addressed the threat posed by Iraq and assessed that Iraq’s capabilities and intentions were limited and related to the balance of power in the region and internal challenges. (Section 4.2; p. 247).

Also, in a particularly revealing and arguably damning statement, Chilcot states that Blair had embarked upon a strategy of what was effectively misrepresentation right from the start. Chilcot writes: ‘The tactics chosen by Mr Blair were to emphasise the threat which Iraq might pose, rather than a more balanced consideration of both Iraq’s capabilities and intent … That remained Mr Blair’s approach in the months that followed'. However, having confirmed that both intelligence officials and Blair himself were involved in inaccurate representations of the intelligence, and even stating that this was a ‘tactic’, thereby implying awareness and intentionality on the part of Blair, Chilcot avoids characterizing this as deception or questioning Blair’s good faith.

But the most damning revelation concerns the historical starting point for Chilcot. As the early parts of the report makes clear, close British involvement in planning for action started in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when elements within the US administration sought to take advantage of that event in order to pursue a long standing objective of toppling Saddam Hussein. The report quotes a British embassy report dated 15 September 2001 which states that ‘The 'regime-change hawks' in Washington were arguing that a coalition put together for one purpose (against international terrorism) could be used to clear up other problems in the region.’ (Section 3.1, p.324). The report then cites Blair’s considerations with respect to the emerging ‘war on terror’ strategy:

‘… in order to give ourselves space that we say: “Phase 1 is the military action focused on Afghanistan because it’s there that the perpetrators of 11 September hide.

'Phase 2 is the medium and longer term campaign against terrorism in all its forms. Of course we will discuss that … This kicks it away for the moment but leaves all options open. We just don’t need it debated freely in public until we know what exactly we want to do; and how we can do it.'

Blair concluded that a 'dedicated tightly knit propaganda unit' was required, and suggested that he and President Bush should 'talk soon'. (Section 3.1, p 338). By December 2001, Blair appears to have signed up to the objective of regime change in Iraq:

‘Mr Blair told President Bush that he was not opposed to the removal of Saddam Hussein, but an extremely clever plan would be needed’ (Section 3.1, p. 367).

‘Mr Blair suggested a strategy for regime change in Iraq that would build over time which would permit military action to be taken 'if necessary, without losing international support'. (Section 3.1, p. 368).

Chilcot reiterates the point again in his conclusions:

Mr Blair’s discussion with President Bush on 3 December and the paper he sent to President Bush the following day represented a significant development of the UK’s approach. Mr Blair suggested a 'clever strategy' for regime change in Iraq that built over time, until the point was reached where “military action could be taken if necessary”, without losing international support (Section 3.1, p. 82).

So, in what appears to be unambiguous language, Chilcot confirms that Blair was signed up to regime change from December 2001, just months after 9/11. Of course, the problem for Blair is that it was his declared position that disarmament, not regime change, was the British government’s objective. And that the claimed disarmament objective logically left open the possibility that Saddam could be left in power if he complied with disarmament demands. But if regime change was always the objective, leaving Saddam in power was logically excluded.

As with the deliberate exaggeration (or ‘emphasis’ as Chilcot puts it) re the intelligence, Chilcot avoids drawing the obvious conclusion that Blair pursued a strategy of deception in which disarmament, and not regime change, was the claimed objective and whereby, as a result, the public (and parliament) were deceived into believing that policy allowed reasonable prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict through Iraq compliance/disarmament. Chilcot appears to make this leap of faith even though his report appears to offer no clear and substantial evidence of the US ever having shifted from its objective of regime change (see section 3.1 of the report) and provides ample contemporaneous evidence that the lauded ‘UN route’ was largely about making military action ‘much easier’ (Section 3.5, p. 124) and making it more likely to obtain international support (Section 3.5: p. 126). The facts of regime change having been official US policy since the 1990s and the ample empirical evidence that British commitment to regime change came first, and was only articulated in terms of disarmament through the UN in order to provide legal cover for war and help build international support (See Herring and Robinson 2014), flatly contradicts apparent Chilcot’s apparent assertion/implication that the British government policy genuinely allowed for a peaceful outcome.     

Of course, it may be that Chilcot’s repeated quotation of Blair’s term ‘clever’ was a subtle inference of deception and manipulation as that word can be taken to suggest ‘slyness’ or ‘cunning’. It is also perhaps telling that Chilcot quotes Blair’s own use of the term ‘propaganda’, which also today is clearly understood to relate to manipulative and deceptive communication. But Chilcot does not make this clear and leaves it to the reader to draw the obvious inference from the evidence presented. Furthermore, by appearing to locate Blair’s ‘clever’ strategy in the context of US administration hawks taking advantage of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, Chilcot only alludes to the broader strategic backdrop involving neoconservative aspirations regarding power and influence in the Middle East and the question of resources and oil. On this bigger picture issue, the Chilcot Report tells us little, which is a major failing of the report, and this is surely a critical area for full exploration and debate now. 

To conclude, from an initial reading, it certainly does not appear to be the case that the Chilcot report exonerates Blair from deceiving the public, as he is currently claiming; nor does the report give any credence to Campbell’s claims that the dossier was not sexed up. In fact, the evidence presented in the report appears to show quite clearly that deception did occur through exaggeration of the intelligence and obfuscation of the fact that regime change was the number one objective. Indeed, Chilcot’s choice of quotes suggests strongly that these deceptions were part of a ‘propaganda’ ‘tactic’ employed to get Britain to war. Chilcot lays out the facts, but he pulls his punches. The danger here, ultimately, is that important lessons regarding the role of deception and propaganda in democracy will not be properly absorbed and acted upon. This is, potentially, another major shortcoming of the Chilcot Report.