The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups
by Janice J. Terry
Pluto Press, 168pp, July 2005, 978-0745322599

Review by Muhammad Idrees Ahmad 18 January 2007

The publication of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy has broken what Edward Said had referred to as “America’s last taboo” by opening the debate on the influence of the Israel lobby over US foreign policy. What they left out, however, is the political architecture that allows this and other highly motivated and organized formation of special interests to skew the country’s foreign policy in their desired direction. In a book published a year before the celebrated Walt & Mearsheimer paper -- U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East -- Janice J. Terry had already provided a detailed and accessible analysis of structure and processes central to the formulation of foreign policy in the United States.  

The book received little attention at the time, as its thesis went against the Leftist conventional wisdom of Israel as a "strategic asset" to the US imperial project. A lot changed in the year since: the Mearsheimer & Walt paper encouraged people to start taking this issue head on without having to fear the inevitable labelling and smears. The two authors, however, focused mainly on the effects of the lobby's machinations, while the causes, including the structural context within which special interests thrive, remained unexplored. These are the issues Terry addresses with admirable acuity in this very important book.

Using an opera metaphor, Prof. Terry introduces us to the disparate elements that blend seamlessly into a successful production. Starting with the structure – the architecture of the US government where, since WWII, foreign policy has remained largely within the purview of the executive branch – Terry proceeds to identify agency: the various lobbies and special interests that seek to influence US foreign policy in the interests of their respective constituencies. Terry illustrates the flaws in the electoral system that allow a well organized activist minority to influence policy in areas, such as the Middle East politics, to which the larger part of the population remain indifferent. This success, however, is only possible if the policies are seen to be in the nation’s best interests. This is where the other elements of the opera, such as the score – media and pop culture; and the stage – images and attitudes, come into play. Given the history of bias against Arabs and Muslims and the prevalent stereotypes reinforced through the media, most Americans are predisposed to see them with suspicion, whereas the Jewish character always receives a positive representation. These stereotypes are magnified and projected onto the whole groups, and in the case of the Arabs and Muslims, they are mostly seen as undifferentiated masses, who frequently serve as the bulk of clumsy victims to a Hollywood protagonist’s righteous rage. Policy makers are no more immune to these impulses. Within this cultural backdrop it is always easier for them to make decisions in accord with existing predispositions. This explains why the pro-Israel and Greek lobbies have been far more successful than their Arab counterparts.

The composition, motivations and tactics of the various lobbies offer other clues to their relative success or failures. By juxtaposing the activities of the different lobbies during key episodes in the Carter and Ford administrations Terry illustrates why the Israel lobby has been so much more effective than its counterparts. With ample documentation from the Ford and Carter libraries Terry provides us a glimpse into the different pressures and considerations that policy makers have to contend with routinely. The clout of the Israel lobby is already in evidence with the enormous access that it is afforded through financiers and sympathetic staffers. Fear of the very active Jewish voting block concentrated in populous urban states further diminishes the desire of shrewd politicians to take any decisions that might antagonize them. Many developments have taken place since, which have further enhanced the power of this lobby, prominent among them is the network of think tanks that the lobby has spawned. With Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a spin-off from AIPAC, established to counter the more moderate Brookings Institution, the lobby now directly engages in policy formulation. Similar policy prescriptions published by other think-tanks with ties to the lobby, such as the Hudson Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, and more recently, even the Brookings Institution with its Saban Center, create an illusion of a consensus, resulting in hard-line policies invariably favouring Israel. While many former professional lobbyists for Israel were already part of the Clinton administration, the ascendance of the Neocons has placed them key decision making posts. Security of Israel was declared one of the key motivations behind the invasion of Iraq.

While the book does an admirable job of vulnerabilities of the system which are exploited by the lobbyists and the processes which constitute a successful lobbying campaign, all the examples herein are dated. Things have evolved considerably since the time Carter left office, and the lobbying processes have grown more sophisticated. Some of Carter’s more famous encounters with the Israel Lobby, such as the machinations of New York mayor Ed Koch in foiling Carter’s re-elections are absent in this volume.

This book provides an excellent introduction to an issue that still confounds many. Perhaps what would be invaluable at this moment is a study of the lobby’s advances in the past decade, as the unchecked influence of this lobby is sending the world in a trajectory which could easily end in nuclear annihilation. In the coming days when people start looking for answers as to how this lobby came to dominate US foreign policy in the Middle East, Professor Terry’s book will prove indispensable.