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The US-India nuclear agreement, A triumph for India |
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David Morrison, 1 June 2006
 US President George Bush visited India from 1-3 March 2006. During his
visit, progress was made on the implementation of the US-India nuclear
agreement, signed in Washington on 18 July 2005 during a visit by
Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. Specifically, the two
governments agreed a "separation plan" for India’s nuclear facilities,
as required by the agreement. This plan notionally splits India’s
facilities into "civilian" and "military", as a precursor to the
"civilian" facilities being made subject to IAEA monitoring.
If implemented as signed, the US-India nuclear agreement will exempt
India from the existing international rules for the export of nuclear
material and equipment. As a result, India will acquire the privileges
of the five official "nuclear-weapon" states defined by the NPT [1]
(the US, the UK, Russia, France and China) without having to sign up to
the NPT. Like the official "nuclear-weapon" states, India will be
allowed to keep its nuclear arsenal.
As the Indian Government stated bluntly on 29 July 2005 [2]:
"The issue of India’s nuclear weapons or NPT has not been raised in our
dialogue with the United States. Our dialogue is predicated on India
maintaining its strategic [ie weapons] programme. Our nuclear deterrent
cannot be [the] subject of negotiations with foreign governments and is
strictly within our sovereign domain. India has rejected demands for
joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State."
The international rules
The international rules for the export of nuclear material and
equipment are laid down in the Guidelines of the Nuclear Supplier Group
(NSG) of exporting states (45 in all, today) [3]. Since 1995,
these Guidelines have required a receiving state (apart from the five
official "nuclear-weapon" states) to have "full-scope" IAEA safeguards,
that is, to have an agreement with the IAEA to monitor all the nuclear
facilities under its jurisdiction. The purpose of this
requirement is to seek to prevent such exports being used by the
receiving state, or being exported to another state, for military
purposes.
India does not have full-scope IAEA safeguards at the moment – only a
few of its facilities are subject to IAEA safeguards. As a
consequence, in recent years India has had great difficulty importing
material and equipment for its nuclear power programme. In
particular, it has great difficulty getting hold of enriched uranium
fuel for power reactors at Tarapur, which were supplied by the US in
the 1960s. Since the first Indian nuclear test in 1974, the US
has refused to supply additional fuel for them. In the recent
past, Russia has been the only state willing to stretch the NSG
Guidelines in order to do business with India – it has supplied fuel
for the Tarapur reactors – but it has been widely criticised by other
NSG members including the US for doing so, on the grounds that this
action breached the Guidelines (see my article US entices India with
nuclear bribe [4]). Understandably therefore, India is very keen
to get the rules changed so that it has access to the world market in
nuclear goods.
Under the US-India nuclear agreement, the US is proposing that the
rules be changed dramatically – but only for India. If the US
gets its way, India alone (apart from the five official
"nuclear-weapon" states) will be permitted to import nuclear material
and equipment without having full-scope IAEA safeguards. As we
will see, under the separation plan agreed with the US in March,
whereas India will have to subject more of its nuclear facilities to
IAEA monitoring, it will be free to exempt any facilities that it deems
"military".
Different standards
India is being proposed by the US for this extraordinary privilege,
even though it has never signed the NPT, has developed nuclear weapons
and the means of delivering them, and is not going to sign the NPT now
– it can’t without giving up its nuclear weapons.
John Bolton, the US Ambassador to the UN, was asked recently what case
could be made that Iran is a threat to peace and therefore deserving of
sanction by Security Council. He replied [5]:
"I think that the evidence of Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons, its extensive program to achieve a ballistic missile
capability of longer and longer range and greater accuracy, constitutes
a classic threat to international peace and security …"
By this definition, India constitutes "a classic threat to
international peace and security", and then some, since it isn’t just
making efforts to acquire nuclear weapons – it has already acquired
them. But, instead of threatening India with sanctions, not
excluding military sanctions, the US proposes that the existing
international rules be dramatically loosened for India, and India
alone, so that it can import nuclear material and equipment.
It would appear that the US is applying different standards to Iran and India.
"Non-nuclear weapon" states
All states that signed up to the NPT as "non-nuclear-weapon" states
should be eligible for importing nuclear material and equipment under
NSG Guidelines – since they are required by Article III(1) of the
Treaty to have IAEA safeguards that "shall be applied on all source or
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within
the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out
under its control anywhere". In other words, full-scope
safeguards.
Under Article III(2), NPT signatories agree not to export nuclear
material or equipment unless the receiving state has such safeguards in
place:
"Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source
or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production
of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for
peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material
shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article."
However, the NPT itself doesn’t specify the material and equipment that
should not be exported to states without full-scope safeguards.
Nuclear Suppliers Group
It was to fill this gap that, just after the NPT came into force in
1970, international guidelines were established specifying a "trigger
list" of materials and equipment falling within the ambit of Article
III(2). In 1975, in response to India’s explosion of a nuclear
device the previous year, the NSG was set up (see Arms Control
Association fact sheet on it here [6]). It now has 45 member
states, including all the major nuclear powers.
Note, however, that the NSG is voluntary association of states – it was
not established by international treaty and it has no enforcement
mechanism to ensure that members adhere to its Guidelines.
Although the NSG Guidelines provide a necessary supplement to the NPT,
NSG members represent a small subset of the 190 states or so that have
signed the NPT – nearly every state in the world apart from Israel,
India and Pakistan has done so. These states meet as a body every
five years to review the operation of the NPT, but the NSG Guidelines,
which affect how the NPT operates, are not determined by the NPT
signatories, but by the 45 members of the NSG, who have a commercial
interest in expanding the market for nuclear material and
equipment. This greatly improves the chances of the US getting
the NSG Guidelines changed in India’s favour.
(To add to the confusion, the agency responsible for policing the NPT –
the IAEA – is a different body again, with 139 affiliated states,
including Israel, India and Pakistan.)
NSG Guidelines
As I have said, the key feature of the existing NSG Guidelines [7] is
that a recipient state must have full-scope IAEA safeguards. This
is specified in paragraph 4(a) of the Guidelines:
"Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology to
a non-nuclear-weapon State only when the receiving State has brought
into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of
safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its
current and future peaceful activities [my emphasis]."
Here, the phrase "non-nuclear-weapon State" has the meaning laid down
in the NPT. In Article IX(3) of it, a "nuclear-weapon State" is
defined as "one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967". There
are five of them in this world – the US, the UK, Russia, France and
China – and there will never be any more. According to this NPT
definition, every other state in the world apart from these five is a
"non-nuclear-weapon State", including states outside the NPT like India
that have nuclear weapons.
Endorsed by NPT conferences
The NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 endorsed the NSG’s
decision to require full-scope safeguards for nuclear exports (Decision
2 [8], paragraph 12) and the NPT Review Conference in 2000 again
supported this principle ([9], paragraph 48).
Norman Wulf, the US representative at the 2000 Conference, wrote the
following in Arms Control Today in November 2000 about its conclusions:
"The conference emphasized the central importance of nuclear export
controls and reinforced the requirement in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) Guidelines for full-scope IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon
states as a condition of nuclear supply. By doing so, NPT parties again
supported the principle that non-NPT parties should not be eligible for
the same degree of assistance to civil nuclear programs as NPT parties
in good standing. Reinforcement of this guideline is important given
some who have questioned whether this principle should be relaxed for
India and Pakistan, which have not accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards.
The answer from NPT parties is clearly no. In that regard, the United
States is seriously concerned about the recent Russian decision to
supply fuel to India's Tarapur reactors. This decision … runs counter
to the sentiment expressed at the NPT review conference …." [10]
Plainly, the US stance today towards India is the converse of its stance, and the stance of the NPT review conference, in 2000.
"Nuclear-weapon" states
Having exploded a nuclear weapon before 1 January 1967, five states –
the US, the UK, Russia, France and China – qualify to sign up to the
NPT as "nuclear-weapon" states and are allowed by the NPT to keep their
nuclear weapons. The only significant obligation placed upon them
is in Article I of the Treaty, which says:
"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices."
This is not an onerous obligation, since they have an interest in
preventing other states acquiring the ultimate weapon of self-defence,
that is, nuclear weapons.
Also, in stark contrast to "non-nuclear-weapon" states, they have no
obligation to place any of their nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards. True, each of the "nuclear-weapon" states has a
voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The IAEA Safeguards
Statement for 2002 [11] explains:
"Voluntary offer safeguards agreements have been concluded with the
five nuclear-weapon States. Each State offers some or all of its
civilian nuclear material and/or facilities from which the Agency may
select some for the application of safeguards."
Note that the materials and facilities within the scope of the
agreement are "offered" for inspection by the "nuclear-weapon" state
and the "offer" can be withdrawn at any time. Needless to say,
materials and facilities with a military purpose are not offered for
inspection. The IAEA carried out no inspections at all in Russia
in 2002, because "no facilities were designated for inspection" by
Russia [11].
These arrangements are a far cry from the full-scope IAEA safeguards
required of all "non-nuclear-weapon" states that have signed the
NPT. These safeguards have the well-defined purpose of seeking to
ensure that "non-nuclear-weapon" states are not developing nuclear
weapons. However, the purpose of partial-scope IAEA safeguards in
states that already possess nuclear weapons is not obvious.
Manifestly, it cannot be to prevent the development of a nuclear
weapons capability. Nor can it play any role in monitoring, let
alone restraining, nuclear weapons production – since oversight of
military installations is always outside the scope of the safeguards.
Why do "nuclear-weapon" states enter into these "voluntary offer
safeguards agreements"? The IAEA Safeguards Glossary [12] says
that they do so "inter alia, to allay concerns that the application of
IAEA safeguards could lead to commercial disadvantages for the nuclear
industries of non-nuclear-weapon States" (paragraph 1.21). Can it
be that they are merely to add to the overheads of the nuclear
industries in the official "nuclear-weapon" states?
The separation plan
The safeguards arrangement that the US has agreed with India bears some
similarity to these "voluntary offer safeguards agreements".
India’s nuclear facilities are to be divided into "civilian" and
"military", with a view to placing the "civilian" under IAEA
safeguards, so that material originating from "civilian" facilities is
not used for military purposes by India.
Robert Joseph, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security in the State Department, spelt out the US requirements for the
split to the House International Relations Committee on 8 September
2005, as follows [13]:
"… the civil/military split must be comprehensive enough … to provide
strong assurances to supplier states and the IAEA that materials and
equipment provided as part of civil cooperation will not be diverted to
the military sphere."
This means that all foreign-supplied reactors, and all reactors fuelled
from abroad, will have to be deemed "civilian" on a permanent basis.
For domestic consumption, India has sought to present the additional
IAEA oversight as the result of India accepting "the same
responsibilities and practices as other states with advanced nuclear
technology", in other words, that the new arrangements amounted to a
"voluntary offer safeguards agreement", like those entered into by
official "nuclear-weapon" states. See, for example, the Indian
Government statement of 29 July 2005 [2], which went so far as to say:
"Nuclear weapon states, including the US, have the right to shift
facilities from civilian category to military and there is no reason
why this should not apply to India."
However, it is clear that India will not enjoy the complete flexibility
of a "voluntary offer safeguards agreement", in particular, the ability
to move facilities in and out of safeguards at will. Facilities
that are declared "civilian" will have to stay "civilian", certainly
those that are imported. Reporting to the Lok Sabha on 6
March 2006, the Prime Minister Singh admitted this, saying [14]:
"India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific
safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards
agreement to this end with the IAEA [my emphasis]."
However, India will retain great flexibility in the designation of
Indian-built facilities. The Indian Government document entitled
Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18,
2005: India’s Separation Plan [15] sets out the principles on which
this designation is based. They are:
"Include in the civilian list only those facilities offered for
safeguards that, after separation, will no longer be engaged in
activities of strategic [ie military] significance.
"The overarching criterion would be a judgement whether subjecting a
facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India’s national
security.
"However, a facility will be excluded from the civilian list if it is
located in a larger hub of strategic significance, notwithstanding the
fact that it may not be normally engaged in activities of strategic
significance.
"A civilian facility would therefore, be one that India has determined not to be relevant to its strategic programme."
In practice, therefore Indian-built facilities that are essentially
civilian in nature, but may have a subsidiary military function, will
be deemed "military", for example, power reactors producing electricity
for the national grid will be deemed "military" if plutonium for
military purposes is going to be extracted from their spent fuel.
Civilian/military split
India has 22 "thermal" nuclear power reactors in operation or under
construction. The 6 foreign-supplied reactors (2 by US at
Tarapur, 2 by Canada and 2 under construction by Russia) are, or are
scheduled to be, under IAEA safeguards. India has decided that
these 6, and 8 other Indian-built reactors (as yet unspecified), are
going to be designated "civilian" and put under IAEA safeguards by
2014. This leaves a further 8 Indian-built power reactors that
will be designated "military", presumably to allow plutonium for
weapons production to be extracted.
India also has a couple of "breeder" reactors, which are important for
the production of plutonium. India has designated these as
"military".
For the future, to quote Prime Minister Singh in his report to the Lok Sabha on 6 March 2006 [14]:
"India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian
thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the
Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors
as civilian. This means that India will not be constrained in any way
in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as
per our national requirements."
He also announced that there would be no IAEA oversight of the Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre (which he described as "a nuclear facility of
high national security importance") or of "reprocessing and enrichment
capabilities and other facilities associated with the fuel cycle for
our strategic programme".
He was adamant that the separation plan would "not adversely affect our strategic programme" saying:
"There will be no capping of our strategic programme, and the
separation plan ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs
to meet the current and future requirements of our strategic programme,
based on our assessment of the threat scenarios. No constraint has been
placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes.
The integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine and our ability to sustain a
Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrent is adequately protected. Our nuclear
policy will continue to be guided by the principles of restraint and
responsibility."
Breaking the NPT?
Article I of the NPT requires:
"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty … not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices … ."
In this context, India is a "non-nuclear-weapon" state, since it’s not
one of the five defined by the NPT to be "nuclear-weapon" states.
The proposed IAEA safeguards for India may ensure that nuclear material
and equipment imported by India, and any nuclear material generated by
imported equipment, is not used for weapons production. However,
India’s ability to import nuclear material for civilian purposes may
mean that indigenous material, which would otherwise have to be used
for civilian purposes, is available for weapons production. The
prime example of this is uranium, of which India has a limited supply.
In other words, "nuclear-weapon" states that supply India with nuclear
material and equipment may actually be in breach of their Article I
duty "not in any way to assist" India with its weapons programmes.
Amending US law
The implementation of the agreement requires that the US Congress amend
US law (the Atomic Energy Act 1954 as amended by the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act 1978) to make an exception for India and that the
NSG do likewise in respect of its Guidelines.
There is opposition to the agreement in Congress – on the grounds that
the agreement rewards India for failing to sign the NPT and because the
US is not getting much in return (apart from the possibility of
business for the US nuclear industry). However, it is expected
that an appropriate amendment to US law will eventually be passed – an
amendment drawn up by the White House has been formally proposed in the
House and Senate.
Last autumn, India’s lack of enthusiasm for the US demand that Iran be
reported to the Security Council bolstered the opposition to the
agreement in Congress, but this is no longer a factor since India voted
for the IAEA Board resolution of 6 February 2006 that reported Iran to
the Security Council. (In one of the many ironies that surround
these matters, because its nuclear industry is technically advanced,
India is always a member of the IAEA Board and, despite not being a
signatory to the NPT itself, acts as a judge about whether signatories
to the NPT are abiding by it).
There is little doubt that India’s vote was motivated by a desire to
dampen opposition to the agreement in the US Congress. Back in
January, David Mulford, the US Ambassador in New Delhi, stated publicly
that the nuclear deal was off, unless India voted to refer Iran to the
Security Council. On 25 January 2006, he told the Press Trust of
India news agency that, if India didn’t vote for referral, then the
US-India nuclear deal would "die in Congress" (see BBC report [16]).
But, this is the only obvious policy shift by India so far at the
behest of the US. The US has also been very keen that India pull
out of deals with Iran for a gas pipeline to India through Pakistan and
for the purchase of vast quantities of liquefied natural gas over 25
years beginning in 2009. However, after a visit by Dr Mehdi
Safari, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister to New Delhi on 23 February
2006, a statement from the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said [17]:
"The two sides … reaffirmed their commitment to the Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline and an early ratification of the LNG deal already signed
between the two countries."
Amending NSG guidelines
The US administration has said publicly that it will not go ahead with
the agreement unless the NSG, which operates by consensus, agrees to an
appropriate amendment to its Guidelines. Under Secretary Joseph
stated this categorically in evidence to the House International
Relations Committee on 8 September 2005 [13] in response to the
committee chairman, Henry Hyde, who asked:
"I was hoping you can assure us today, no matter what else happens, the
Administration will continue to abide by NSG guidelines, and if you are
unable to gain consensus within the NSG for the amendment you need, you
will not implement the new India policy in violation of NSG guidelines.
Can you give us that assurance?"
Joseph replied:
"Mr. Chairman, we can certainly assure you that we intend to take no
action that would undercut the effectiveness of the NSG. It is a very
important nonproliferation tool. Our intention is not to change
either the consensus procedure of the NSG or to even change the NSG
commitment to full scope safeguards as a condition of supply."
Except for India, of course.
A draft US amendment to the NSG guidelines to make an exception for
India was discussed at an NSG meeting on 22-23 March 2006, but didn’t
meet with universal approval and no decision was taken (see [18] for
text of amendment and an account of the meeting). It should be
emphasised that the amendment is country-specific, applying to India
alone, the key element being:
"Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c), of INFCIRC/254/Part 1
as revised [the existing NSG guidelines], Participating Governments [in
the NSG] may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to
the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India (a State not party,
and never having been a party, to the NPT) as long as the participating
Government intending to make the transfer is satisfied that India
continues to fully meet all of the aforementioned nonproliferation and
safeguards commitments, and all other requirements of the NSG
Guidelines."
If this is passed, there will be one set of rules for all states in the world bar India and a very different set for India.
Most likely, none of the 45 members of the NSG will hold out against
the US. They are, to a greater or lesser extent, suppliers of
nuclear material and equipment, so they have a commercial interest in
seeing the market for their goods expanded to include India.
France and Russia, which are major suppliers of nuclear material and
equipment, have publicly expressed enthusiasm for the US
proposal. And the US administration has claimed from the outset
that Britain is onside (see, for example [19]) but, to the best of my
knowledge, the British government has yet to state this publicly.
The interests of NSG members are not the same as the other 150 or so
NPT signatories, some of whom will not be pleased to see India, which
stayed outside the NPT in order to develop nuclear weapons, being
permitted to import nuclear goods without having full-scope IAEA
safeguards – a requirement endorsed by NPT members at their 1995 and
2000 conferences. But, as things stand, if the NSG supplier
states unanimously agree to change the rules so that they can do
business with India, then the rules will be changed – and there is
nothing other NPT members as a body can do about it.
Bush gibbers
At a press conference in New Delhi on 2 March 2006 [20], Jim Axelrod of CBS News had the temerity to ask President Bush:
"… what kind of message, sir, does it send to the world that India,
which has been testing [nuclear weapons] as late as 1998 … and … has
not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- is this a reward for
bad behavior, as some critics suggest? And what kind of message does it
send to other countries that are in the process of developing nuclear
technology? Why should they sign the NPT if India is getting a deal
without doing so, sir?"
There is no presentable answer to this. Particularly, for a
President whose National Security Strategy published in March 2006 [21]
declares:
"The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our national security."
and sets an objective of
"closing a loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that permits
regimes to produce fissile material that can be used to make nuclear
weapons under cover of a civilian nuclear power program".
So adherence to (a tightened) NPT is apparently a sine qua non of
countering the greatest threat to US national security – but India is
an exception which is to be rewarded for not adhering (while Iran which
is adhering is to be denied what is supposed to be its "inalienable
right" under the NPT to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes).
The President had no presentable answer and he gibbered for a full two
minutes. It’s worth viewing on the White House website
[20]. It begins with the following insights:
"What this agreement says is things change, times change, that
leadership can make a difference, and telling the world -- sending the
world a different message from that which is -- what used to exist in
people's minds.
"I -- listen, I've always said this was going to be a difficult deal
for the Prime Minister to sell to his parliament, but he showed great
courage and leadership. And it's difficult for the American President
to sell to our Congress, because some people just don't want to change
and change with the times. I understand that. But this agreement is in
our interests, and therefore, Jim, I'm confident we can sell this to
our Congress as in the interest of the United States, and at the same
time make it clear that there's a way forward for other nations to
participate in a -- in civilian nuclear power in such a way as to
address nonproliferation concerns."
In fact, the Indian Prime Minister has required little or no courage in
arguing for the deal – because the deal required India to do very
little, and required it to do absolutely nothing to restrain its
nuclear weapons programme. As the Prime Minister told the Lok
Sabha on 6 March 2006 [14]:
"There will be no capping of our strategic [ie nuclear weapons]
programme, … . No constraint has been placed on our right to
construct new facilities for strategic purposes."
Both sides to the deal are agreed on this: for example, Condoleezza
Rice stated it plainly to the House International Relations Committee
on 5 April 2006, saying [22]:
"The initiative does not cap Indian nuclear weapons production …"
This was India’s bottom line, and it has achieved its bottom
line. Without having its nuclear weapons capability restrained in
any way, it will gain access to nuclear materials and equipment for the
expansion of its nuclear power programme, access that has been almost
completely denied to it for more than 30 years. It will acquire
the privileges of a "nuclear-weapon" state recognised by the NPT
without having to sign up the NPT. The deal is a triumph for
India.
The interesting question is: will the US get its hoped for quid pro quo
– that India moves decisively into the US camp in world affairs?
References:
[1] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf
[2] http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm
[3] http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/
[4] http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/india/us-india-agreement.htm
[5] http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/65458.htm
[6] http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG.asp
[7] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf254r2p1.shtml
[8] http://disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/npt/1995dec2.htm
[9] http://disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/npt/finaldoc.html
[10] http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_11/wulf.asp
[11] http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2002.html
[12] http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf
[13] http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa23323.000/hfa23323_0f.htm
[14] http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm
[15] http://meaindia.nic.in/treatiesagreement/2006/07ta0703200601.pdf
[16] http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4647956.stm
[17] http://www.mea.gov.in/
[18] http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/india/20060327_DraftNSGProposal.asp
[19] usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2005/Sep/09-968262.html
[20] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060302-9.html
[21] http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf
[22] http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/ric040506.pdf
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