Dogmatic thinking in the White House led Karl Rove and Scooter Libby not just to ignore intelligence that contradicted their policy of war in Iraq, but to take revenge against the messengers—actions for which they can soon expect consequences. 

This White House tactic, used against not only Joe Wilson but also Erik Shinseki, Paul O’Neill and Richard Clarke, has had a chilling effect on debate. Indeed, the defense and foreign policy think tanks in Washington have been loath to explore strategic alternatives. That's because by time of the attacks of the Iraq war, most of those think tanks had been captured by donors either supportive of the administration and of the war, or by those politically afraid to challenge it. Despite the recent change in opinion polls, this situation continues today.

Charles V. Peña is the former director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute.  He is a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and writes for the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information. 

Think tanks should be part of an open marketplace of ideas to inform and shape the policy debate. But in the case of defense and foreign policy—especially Iraq policy—there continues to be a very narrow range of thinking.  In the consumer marketplace, having few choices results in higher prices and lower quality.  But because in defense and foreign policy our national security is at stake, a small number of low-quality options is downright dangerous—and indeed, we are seeing the consequences today.

Because so much is at stake, America needs think tanks that can be honest brokers in the defense and foreign policy debate—able to put forth ideas without fear of political reprisal.  And just as importantly, they must be able to think outside the box and propose policy prescriptions and program solutions that are beyond the conventional thinking of both political parties.  Otherwise, what passes for strategic thinking is simply an exercise in triangulation to find what is deemed palatable enough to gain political and popular acceptance.

This problem of politicization affects both the right and the left. The right or conservative side of the policy marketplace spectrum essentially espouses the now-familiar Bush administration talking points, first for going to war against Iraq and then for spreading democracy.  Conservative—even libertarian—organizations have signed on to a Republican version of Wilsonianism, at least in Iraq, if not the rest of the Middle East and world.  Seeking much-coveted access to the White House, they allow themselves to believe that they are influencing administration thinking. The reality is just the opposite: It is the administration that is shaping think tank policy.  As a result, the institutions become cheerleaders and lose one of their most important qualities in the process: independence. The loss of independence, in turn, erodes their credibility.

Even worse for conservative think tanks is that they end up abandoning some of their core conservative principles to curry favor with the administration.  Instead of standing up for individual rights and liberty, they endorsed the USA PATRIOT Act and remained strangely silent when a federal judge upheld the president’s right to indefinitely detain an American citizen in a military brig without charging him.  And their voices are lost in the wilderness when a conservative Republican president turns out to be a big spender, expanding the size of the federal government in much the same way as FDR’s New Deal or LBJ’s Great Society programs.

On the other side of the spectrum, the liberal or left-of-center think tanks find themselves tied in knots, unable to muster forth a coherent alternative to the Bush policies.  Supporting a foreign policy based in large part on humanitarian intervention means they cannot reconcile the fact that the Bush administration’s so-called unilateral invasion of Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein closely resembled President Clinton’s decision to take military action against Slobodan Milosevic in Bosnia.  Both were military actions against sovereign states conducted without the formal approval of the U.N. Security Council and neither represented an imminent threat to U.S. security.  And both were rationalized on humanitarian grounds.

Moreover, supporting humanitarian intervention means liberal policy organizations have little choice but to support the Bush administration’s vision of building a stable and democratic Iraq.  The only real policy alternative they can put forth is that they would do a better job by getting more participation from the international community (meaning the French and Germans).  But since France and Germany so staunchly opposed the war, there is little likelihood that they will be willing to jump into the fray now—especially with the escalating violence of the insurgency.

Liberal think tanks are also stuck in a conundrum when it comes to nuclear proliferation.  So enamored with arms control, they are unable to recognize its limitations.  When non-proliferation efforts fail, their answer is to redouble those efforts.  But this is exactly the definition of insanity: to keep doing the same thing and expect different results.  And they do not see that if the threat of military action is part of enforcing a non-proliferation regime, then the use of force logically follows if arms control fails.

And both sides are victims of the intimidation factor.  Conservative think tanks wanting to be in the good graces of the administration cannot advocate truly different, if not radical, alternatives to existing foreign policy initiatives— especially in Iraq—for fear of being labeled “unpatriotic” or “not serious.”  Their liberal counterparts are afflicted by the same problem—indeed, more so—given the McGovernite legacy of liberals being “weak on defense.”

Ultimately, the problem with too many think tanks is that they have become captive of politics.  Many people in these organizations aspire to be political appointees—indeed, many are former political appointees.  So they say and write what they believe will help them land a job in the current administration or what they hope will be the next administration.  Too often that means pulling their punches, which only perpetuates the status quo thinking that permeates Washington.

The think tanks tolerate this because their donor bases are increasingly political, seeking to use what should be apolitical institutions to advance their political agendas.  Like any business, think tanks need money to operate.  But funders are not the same as customers, and think tanks should not exist simply to satisfy their donors. 

This is especially true when those donors are corporations. There is nothing wrong with corporations supporting policy research organizations, but the latter should not be captive of the former. And it is only fair to ask how objective a think tank can be on national security issues if a substantial portion of its funding comes from the defense industry.

In the final analysis, think tanks should be captive to producing ideas that advance the public policy debate.  When those ideas are at odds with the politics of Washington, think tanks should not bend to politics or seek to be players in the political power game.  Unfortunately, it seems that they are drifting—if not already moored—in that direction. 

Given the current state of play, the Washington think tank landscape needs a makeover.  Maybe it is time for new think tanks to take root and do what too few seem to be willing to do: Like the child in Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tale, say that the emperor has no clothes.